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Abstract—Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices that are limited in
power and processing capabilities are susceptible to physical
layer (PHY) spoofing (signal exploitation) attacks owing to their
inability to implement a full-blown protocol stack for security.
The overwhelming adoption of multicarrier techniques such as
orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) for the PHY
layer makes IoT devices further vulnerable to PHY spoofing
attacks. These attacks which aim at injecting bogus/spurious
data into the receiver, involve inferring transmission parameters
and finding PHY characteristics of the transmitted signals so
as to spoof the received signal. Non-contiguous (NC) OFDM
systems have been argued to have low probability of exploitation
(LPE) characteristics against classic attacks based on cyclosta-
tionary analysis, and the corresponding PHY has been deemed
to be secure. However, with the advent of machine learning
(ML) algorithms, adversaries can devise data-driven attacks to
compromise such systems. It is in this vein that PHY spoofing
performance of adversaries equipped with supervised and unsu-
pervised ML tools are investigated in this paper. The supervised
ML approach is based on estimation/classification utilizing deep
neural networks (DNN) while the unsupervised one employs
variational autoencoders (VAEs). In particular, VAEs are shown
to be capable of learning representations from NC-OFDM signals
related to their PHY characteristics such as frequency pattern
and modulation scheme, which are useful for PHY spoofing. In
addition, a new metric based on the disentanglement principle is
proposed to measure the quality of such learned representations.
Simulation results demonstrate that the performance of the
spoofing adversaries highly depends on the subcarriers’ allocation
patterns used at the transmitter. Particularly, it is shown that
utilizing a random subcarrier occupancy pattern precludes the
adversary from spoofing and secures NC-OFDM systems against
ML-based attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of radio signal propagation along with
standardized transmission schemes and intermittent commu-
nications make wireless communication systems extremely
vulnerable to interception and spoofing attacks. Specifically,
the broadcast nature of the wireless medium facilitates the
reception of radio signals by any illegitimate receiver as long
as it is within the coverage radius of the transmitter. Further,
standardized transmission and conventional security schemes
open up wireless systems to interception and eavesdropping
[2]. Additionally, sporadic transmissions of low-cost wireless
devices, especially the significantly growing number of Internet-
of-Things (IoT) devices, provide massive opportunities to
adversaries and malicious actors for spoofing attacks. Therefore,
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it is of paramount importance for wireless communication
systems to enhance the security mechanisms meant to combat
the adversaries, especially in light of the ongoing adoption of
IoT systems in industrial applications.
IoT devices that have limited battery and computational
resources may not be able to execute a full-blown protocol stack
for security and authentication (non-access stratum (NAS))
purposes [3]. Physical layer (PHY) security has been put
forth as a promising solution in this case, which aims at
exploiting the PHY characteristics of the communication links.
We study PHY spoofing attacks in IoT networks enabled
with multicarrier communications where an adversary spoofs
a legitimate transmitter by sending bogus data to its intended
receiver. Specifically, we consider an adversary which is
equipped with cutting-edge machine learning (ML) tools,
and aims at inferring PHY parameters of OFDM/NC-OFDM
signals used by the transmitter. Knowledge of these parameters
enables the adversary to generate signals similar to those
of the transmitter’s and perform spoofing attacks. It is in
this context that we investigate the robustness of OFDM/NC-
OFDM systems against ML-aided PHY spoofing attacks. Our
focus is in particular on understanding the corresponding PHY
characteristics that can help secure such IoT systems.
A. Relation to prior work
Current attempts at using PHY characteristics as authentica-
tion keys for the message source follow various approaches.
One possibility is to assume a pre-shared secret key hidden in
the modulation scheme, which is detected by the receiver [4],
[5]. In other keyless transmitter-based methods (also known as
wireless fingerprinting), device-specific non-ideal transmission
parameters are extracted from the received signal. These are
identified as characteristics of the claimed source and then
compared with those from previous authenticated messages [6].
Channel-based authentication algorithms [7], [8] compare the
channel response estimated from the current message with that
estimated from the previous ones by the claimed source, thus
actually authenticating the position of the transmitter rather than
its identity. However, the attacker in these works is assumed to
only use higher-layer identity forging (e.g., spoofing of a MAC
address) and does not try to attack the system by exploiting
the underlying PHY characteristics of the signals. The latter
approach is referred to as PHY spoofing, which is an important
attack that has to be studied since it has been shown to be able
to compromise OFDM systems, which are widely used in IoT
standards [9]. Therefore, we investigate the performance of
powerful attackers enabled with state-of-the-art ML algorithms
in PHY spoofing, and propose exploiting PHY characteristics
to combat such attacks.
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2As mentioned, PHY spoofing is shown to be able to
compromise OFDM systems. NC-OFDM systems in which
transmissions take place over a subset of subcarriers are shown
to be capable of circumventing this impediment [10]. NC-
OFDM systems are also capable of efficiently utilizing the
fragmented spectrum and improving spectral efficiency. The
authors in [1], [11] examined the low probability of exploitation
(LPE) characteristics of NC-OFDM transmissions, assuming
that an adversary is using cyclostationary analysis [12]–[14]
to infer transmission parameters. In [11], the authors showed
that the cyclostationary analysis is extremely challenging to
do for most choices of NC-OFDM transmission parameters.
Therefore, NC-OFDM systems may be deemed to be secure
against PHY spoofing. However, it is not clear if this is still
the case when an adversary utilizes powerful data-driven tools
like ML algorithms for spoofing.
Particularly, a wide range of ML tools have recently received
a lot of attention among communication researchers for solving
analytically intractable problems. In particular, the authors
in [15] proposed an end-to-end learning of communication
systems based on deep neural networks (DNNs). They optimize
transmitter and receiver jointly without considering the classical
communication and signal processing blocks, including channel
encoder and modulator. In [16], the authors showed that deep
learning techniques are very promising in scenarios where
the channel is too complex to be described analytically. The
authors in [17] demonstrated how a DNN-based system can
communicate over-the-air without the need for any conventional
signal processing blocks. Moreover, securing a point-to-point
communication system against a DNN-based attacker trying
to determine the modulation scheme is considered in [18].
B. Our contributions
We investigate the resilience of OFDM/NC-OFDM systems
against PHY spoofing, assuming the adversary is equipped
with ML tools. We assume the adversary continuously listens
to the transmitting terminal, receives either pure noise or
corrupted NC-OFDM/OFDM signals, and builds up a dataset
out of the received signals. Then, it performs a two-stage
ML-based attack. First, it does spectrum sensing in order to
distinguish between the two types of the received signals.
Second, it performs ML algorithms on the dataset of corrupted
NC-OFDM/OFDM signals aiming at spoofing the transmitter.
Spectrum sensing is done via Gaussian-mixture variational
autoencoder (GMVAE) [19] in an unsupervised manner, i.e.,
it does not need labels during training. For the spoofing
attack part, either supervised and unsupervised algorithms are
assumed to be utilized by the adversary in order to infer PHY
parameters. The former relies on true labels during training
while the latter learns from the structure of raw data itself.
For the supervised case, we assume that the adversary trains
a deep feed-forward neural network (DNN) to estimate the
transmission parameters. For the unsupervised scenario, VAEs
are utilized by the adversary to extract representations from the
datasets of NC-OFDM/OFDM signals that can be used for PHY
spoofing. In the unsupervised scenario, we also develop a new
metric based on disentanglement principles [20] to measure
the usefulness of the learned representations for PHY spoofing.
We provide numerical results showing that an adversary
equipped with ML tools is able to spoof an NC-OFDM
system, which was previously considered to be completely
secure against cyclostationary based attacks. Furthermore, we
demonstrate that the representations learned by the VAEs carry
significant information about the PHY characteristics of the
NC-OFDM signals, including the total number of subcarriers,
the amount of power sent in each subcarrier and modulation
schemes (e.g., BPSK and QAM), all of which can be used
by the adversary for PHY spoofing. Hence, unlike what is
suggested by cyclostationary analysis in [1], [11], these results
show that NC-OFDM systems are vulnerable to PHY spoofing
if the adversary is equipped with ML tools. However, we
also establish that the success of spoofing attacks highly
depends on the subcarrier occupancy patterns chosen at the
transmitter; the more structured is the band allocation, the
better is the performance of the adversary in estimating the
transmission parameters. Therefore, in order to secure the
NC-OFDM systems against ML-based attacks, the transmitter
should employ random subcarrier occupancy patterns, where
active subcarriers are chosen in a (pseudo)random fashion to
preclude the adversary from correctly inferring the transmission
parameters and spoofing the signal.
C. Notation and organization
Throughout the paper, vectors are denoted with lowercase
bold letters while uppercase bold letters are reserved for
matrices. The mth element of a vector u is denoted by
u(m). Non-bold letters are used to denote scalar values and
calligraphic letters denote sets. The spaces of real and complex
vectors of length d are denoted by Rd and Cd, respectively.
Also, real and imaginary parts of a complex number a are
denoted by R(a) and I(a), respectively. The expectation and
probability mass (or density) function of a random variable w
are denoted by Ep(w)(·) and p(w), respectively, while Pr(·)
is used to denote the probability of an event.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The sys-
tem model is described in Section II. An introduction to
cyclostationary analysis and its limitations for PHY spoofing
are presented in Section III. In Sections IV and V, PHY
spoofing attacks based on unsupervised and supervised learning
algorithms are discussed, respectively. Section IV also describes
the significance of the learned representations in VAEs for NC-
OFDM/OFDM signals. We introduce a new metric based on the
idea of disentanglement in Section VI to measure the usefulness
of the learned representations for PHY spoofing. Finally, we
present numerical examples that highlight the performance of
learning-based PHY spoofing attacks in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a system composed of a transmitter (Tx), a receiver
(Rx) and an adversary. An important type of attack in this
setting is PHY spoofing where an adversary disguises itself as
a legitimate transmitter and sends spurious data to the receiver
(Fig. 1). Specifically, the adversary overhears the signals sent
by the Tx to the Rx, and its goal is to send bogus data to the
Rx using signals that have similar PHY characteristics to the
3ones sent by the Tx. In this way, the Rx cannot distinguish
the source of the original and the bogus data, and by decoding
the latter, it might compromise the underlying system security
in different ways.
The point-to-point communication link between the Tx and
Rx is assumed to operate over a total bandwidth B composed
of a set of N subcarriers. The transmitter can either transmit
over the whole band in the case of OFDM transmissions, or a
subset of subcarriers (known as active subcarriers) in the case
of NC-OFDM transmissions. The signal transmitted by the Tx
can be written as:
s(t) =
m=+∞∑
m=−∞
N∑
n=1
um(n)sm,npm,ne
j2pifn(t−mTo)g(t−mTo),
(1)
where sm,n ∈ C and pm,n ∈ R are the transmitted symbol
and a power factor corresponding to the nth subcarrier in
the mth time slot, respectively. The total duration of one NC-
OFDM/OFDM symbol is given by To = Tu+Tcp, with Tu and
Tcp being the NC-OFDM symbol duration and the duration
of the cyclic prefix, respectively. Furthermore, u is called
subcarrier occupancy pattern, which is a binary vector of size
N whose elements are zero for inactive subcarriers and one
for active subcarriers. Particularly, for an OFDM transmission
u amounts to an all-one vector of size N . We assume g(·) is
a rectangular pulse of width To centered at To/2. The center
frequency of each subcarrier is denoted by fn = n∆f where
∆f = 1/Tu represents the width of each subcarrier.
For each OFDM/NC-OFDM symbol, the Tx chooses the
parameters ∆f , u and N and transmits a signal to the Rx.
The positions of active subcarriers in u either follow a certain
pattern or are totally random. The adversary seeks to find these
transmission parameters in order to generate waveforms similar
to (1), inject bogus data in place of sm,n, and transmit them
to the receiver. We assume the Rx only decodes data that are
being sent over the active subcarriers with the correct ∆f
and N chosen by Tx; otherwise, a decoding failure will occur.
Therefore, we utilize bit error rate (BER) at Rx as a measure to
evaluate the performance of the adversary in terms of spoofing.
If this BER is close to that of the baseline transmission (where
the parameters are perfectly known at the Rx), it is indicative
of the maximum spoofing performance of the adversary. At the
other extreme, a BER close to 0.5 suggests that the adversary
cannot do much in terms of spoofing, i.e., Tx-Rx transmission
is secured against PHY spoofing. We note that as Tx may
use a different set of transmission parameters to transmit each
NC-OFDM/OFDM symbol (e.g. sending over a different set
of subcarriers), these parameters need to be estimated by the
Rx as well in order to ensure reliable communication for the
legitimate parties.
A. Channel model
The system model in Fig. 1 consists of three channels
corresponding to the pairs Tx-Rx (TR), Tx-Adversary (TA)
and Adversary-Rx (AR), where each could have a specific
channel impulse response (CIR) denoted by hTR(t), hTA(t)
and hAR(t), respectively, and a different signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR). Particularly, the spoofing performance highly depends
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Fig. 1. PHY spoofing by an adversary overhearing Tx-Rx transmissions.
TABLE I
THREE SETS OF TRANSMISSION PARAMETERS USED FOR NC-OFDM
SIGNALS IN EXAMPLE 1.
Case Tu(µs) T0(µs) q
1 320 320 ≤ T0 ≤ 640 5
2 256 320 ≤ T0 ≤ 512 4
3 192 320 ≤ T0 ≤ 384 3
on the SNR of the Tx-Adversary channel, which we call
spoofing SNR in the rest of the paper. For all three channels, the
received signal by a party is given by the convolution r(t) =
s(t)∗h(t) + n(t), where n(t) is additive white Gaussian noise,
and h(t) is the corresponding CIR between the two parties.
The discrete received samples are given by r(t) = r(ti), where
i = 0, . . . , n1 − 1 and n1 represents the number of (complex)
samples. We assume noise samples at different time instances
ti’s are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with zero
mean and variance N0/2. Denoting s = [s(t0), . . . , s(tn1−1)],
signal power is computed by Es = ‖s‖2/n where ‖·‖ is
the l2-norm. Then, SNR and SNR per bit equal Es/N0 and
Eb/N0 =
Es
QN0
, respectively. One can verify that Q equals
Nab/N where Na denotes the number of active subcarriers,
and b is the number of bits sent over each subcarrier.
B. Adversary’s model
From the attacker’s perspective, we assume the adversary has
access to radio equipment for overhearing the transmissions
between two legitimate parties, and is able to sample each
received signal, and build up a dataset out of these samples.
As the adversary is constantly listening to the transmitting
terminal, these received signals may be only noise or an NC-
OFDM/OFDM signal plus noise. Furthermore, we assume
adversary has resources for data processing via ML algorithms,
and is equipped with a radio transmitter for generating signals
with desired parameters and sending them through the AR
channel. Specifically, the adversary utilizes ML to perform a
two-stage attack. First, it performs spectrum sensing in order
to distinguish pure noise from corrupted NC-OFDM/OFDM
signals. Then, a spoofing attack is carried out using only the
corrupted signals. We note that each entry of the dataset may or
may not be associated with the corresponding true transmission
parameters (∆f , N , u) referred to as labels. Depending on the
availability of the labels during the training stage, two types of
ML algorithms are useful: supervised and unsupervised. The
4former makes use of the labels for training the DNNs while the
latter exploits possible data structure and clustering methods
without using labels.
III. PHY SPOOFING VIA CYCLOSTATIONARY ANALYSIS
While cyclic prefix is useful to mitigate the effect of inter-
carrier interference in multicarrier systems, it also enables
an adversary to infer basic transmission parameters using
cyclostationary analysis [12]. Cyclostationary analysis is based
on the auto-correlation function R(t, τ) of the transmitted
signal, which is calculated as
R(t, τ) = E[s(t)s∗(t− τ)] = σ2s
( N∑
n=1
u(n)ej2pifnτ
)
m=∞∑
m=−∞
g(t−mT0)g∗(t−mT0 − τ),
(2)
where σ2s = E[|sm,n|2]. The periodicity of R(t, τ) in t allows
representing it as a Fourier series sum
R(t, τ) =
N∑
n=1
u(n)R(αn, τ)e
j2piαnt, (3)
where αn = n/T0 is the cyclic frequency and R(αn, τ) is
called the cyclic auto-correlation function (CAF). For OFDM
transmissions, this function can provide an adversary with
∆f = 1/Tu [12], [13]. However, for NC-OFDM transmissions
this analysis does not always lead to the correct results as
illustrated in the following example.
Example 1: Consider an NC-OFDM signal with a total
number of subcarriers N = 64 with occupancy pattern vector
u illustrated in Fig. 2, where active subcarriers are spaced
q subcarriers apart (known as interleaved subcarriers). The
transmitter chooses two transmission parameters q and Tu
based on one of the cases listed in Table I and sends (1) over
the channel. Then, the adversary receives the noisy signal,
samples it at an arbitrary rate 1/Ts above Nyquist frequency
to obtain M samples and estimates the CAF function using
Rˆ(α, τ¯Ts) =
1
M
M∑
n=1
r[n]r∗[n− τ¯ ]e−j2piαnTs , (4)
where r[n] denotes the nth obtained sample and τ¯ belongs to
the set of integers. To extract q and Tu corresponding to the
original transmission, the adversary must look at the locations
of the absolute peaks in (4) at α = 0 as illustrated in Fig. 3.
We note that for all three cases, CAF-based analysis results
in the same plot. In other words, the adversary cannot decide
which set of transmission parameters is used by the transmitter.

In the next sections, we study how the adversary can make
use of deep learning models for PHY spoofing. Our main
motivation for taking this approach comes from the fact that
analytical approaches seem to be failing at spoofing even for
simple NC-OFDM systems, which might give PHY designers
the idea that the NC-OFDM PHY is secure. We investigate
the PHY spoofing performance of an adversary equipped with
deep learning tools, which of course comes at the expense of a
Fig. 2. Interleaved subcarrier occupancy pattern with interleaving factor q in
an NC-OFDM symbol.
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Fig. 3. Estimated CAF (4) at α = 0 for the cases in Table I at spoofing SNR
of 5 dB (no fading), where τ = τ¯Ts, τ¯ ∈ [−400, 400] and Ts = 10−6.
higher cost (associated with training), and answer the question
that if/when it is able to do so and what are the parameters
that affect its performance.
IV. PHY SPOOFING VIA UNSUPERVISED LEARNING
We assume the adversary utilizes variational autoencoders
(VAEs) for PHY spoofing in an unsupervised manner. VAEs
are designed based on the idea of variational inference, which
can be described via a latent variable model (LVM). An LVM
is a generative model for a dataset D = {xi}Mi=1 consisting
of M i.i.d. samples of a continuous random variable x. LVM
is defined over a joint distribution pθ(x, z) parameterized by
θ ∈ Rj where z is an unobserved continuous random variable
known as the latent variable (feature space) and j denotes the
model size. The joint density pθ(x, z) is denoted by pθ(x, z) =
p(z)pθ(x|z) where p(z) is a fixed prior over the latent space
and pθ(x|z) is the conditional generator. Then, the inference
problem amounts to finding the posterior of the hidden random
variable z, i.e., pθ(z|x) = pθ(x,z)∫ pθ(x,z)dz . However, this integration
is not tractable for complicated datasets D consisting of high-
dimensional data samples xi’s, and alternative methods must
be utilized in practice to compute it approximately. Variational
inference is a promising optimization-based candidate for this
purpose, and has enjoyed a lot of attention during the past
few years [20]–[22]. Particularly, a VAE learns an optimal
model (θ∗) which maximizes the probability of data samples
by maximizing the expectation of the evidence probabilities,
i.e.,
Ep(x)[log pθ(x)] = Ep(x)[logEp(z)[pθ(x|z)]], (5)
over θ where p(x) denotes the underlying true distribution of
the data in the dataset D. However, this requires computing∫
z
pθ(x|z)p(z)dz which is not tractable. Instead, [21] obtains a
lowerbound called evidence lower bound (ELBO) for individual
data sample xi in (5), which is given by
LELBO(xi) = −DKL(qφ(z|xi)||p(z)) + Eqφ(z|xi)[log pθ(xi|z)].
(6)
5Fig. 4. A schematic of a VAE where encoder and decoder are chosen to be
Gaussian distributions with mean vector µ and diagonal covariance matrix
with variances σ2. These are parameterized by two DNNs trained based on
(7). z and xˆi are generated by sampling from the distributions corresponding
to the encoder and the decoder, respectively.
Then, a VAE solves the following optimization problem,
max
θ,φ
Ep(x)[LELBO(x)] (7)
where θ ∈ Rj and φ ∈ Rh are optimization variables of
dimension j and h, respectively. KL divergence between
two continuous random variables with distributions p(x) and
q(x) is defined as DKL(p||q) =
∫∞
−∞ p(x) log(
p(x)
q(x) )dx. We
call qφ(z|xi) a probabilistic encoder, since given a data
sample xi it produces a distribution (e.g. a Gaussian) over
the possible values of the code z from which the data sample
xi could have been generated. Similarly, we call pθ(xi|z) a
probabilistic decoder. We choose both encoder and decoder to
be Gaussian with diagonal covariance matrix whose parameters
are estimated by DNNs θ and φ, respectively (see Fig. 4).
The DKL (KL divergence) term in (6) can be seen as a
regularizer that encourages the posterior qφ(z|x) to be close to
the prior p(z), and the second term is called reconstruction loss.
Particularly, when ELBO is maximized the KL-divergence term
approaches zero. This KL term can be computed analytically
as a closed-form expression by choosing specific distributions,
e.g., Gaussian and Bernoulli distributions, for qφ(z|x) and p(z)
[21]. Afterward, one can efficiently minimize the negative of
ELBO using the mini-batch gradient descent algorithm [21].
Mini-batch gradient descent is a variant of the gradient descent
algorithm that splits the training dataset into small batches
that are then used to calculate the loss function followed by
updating the model parameters.
One of the long-standing problems in ML literature is
learning representations from large datasets in an unsupervised
manner that facilitates the downstream learning tasks (e.g.,
classification). VAEs have shown great potential [23] for
learning such so-called “useful” representations. Although it
is not clear how to define/measure usefulness in unsupervised
settings, researchers have developed the concept of disentangled
representation that offers several advantages. Data samples in
this concept are assumed to be generated via a finite number
of generative factors k1, . . . , kf , each representing notions
like position, scale, rotation, etc., in the case of an image
sample for instance. Although there is no canonical definition
for a disentangled representation, [22] points out that the
learned representations are called disentangled if changes in
one of the generative factors of the data are mirrored by the
encoder in Fig. 4 in exactly one of the latent variables (i.e.,
one dimension of the latent space). We will discuss this in
more depth in Section VI, mention the weaknesses associated
with this definition, and propose a new metric to overcome
some of them for the datasets of NC-OFDM/OFDM signals.
A VAE can encourage learning disentangled representations
by choosing p(z) ∼ N (0, I), which corresponds to different
latent variables being uncorrelated. However, this choice is not
enough to achieve a disentangled representation from large
datasets with high-dimensional data samples since the VAE
objective function in (6) usually incurs a trade-off between the
reconstruction loss and the KL divergence term that determines
the disentanglement level. Hence, researchers have been looking
for ways to not sacrifice one for the other by redesigning
VAEs. In this paper, we will focus on four of the most
effective techniques for learning disentangled representations
and investigate their performances in the context of spoofing
NC-OFDM/OFDM signals.
• β-VAE: The authors in [23] proposed to weight the KL
divergence term in (6) by a real-valued factor β > 1 to
encourage the VAE to learn disentangled representations.
Therefore, the ELBO for data sample xi in β-VAE is
LβELBO(xi) =− β DKL(qφ(z|xi)||p(z))
+ Eqφ(z|xi)[log pθ(x
i|z)]. (8)
An ELBO with a larger β encourages learning disentan-
gled representations as it penalizes more the dissimilarities
between the learned posterior and the prior p(z) ∼ N (0, I)
by weighing the KL term. However, this has been shown
to sacrifice the reconstruction ability of the VAE in large
datasets [23].
• DIP-VAE: Disentangled inferred prior (DIP) VAE
was proposed in [20]. The authors add an extra
term DKL(qφ(z)||p(z)) to ELBO (6) where qφ(z) =∫
qφ(z|x)p(x)dx is the learned prior. By explicitly mini-
mizing this term one can effectively encourage learning
disentangled latent variables without the need for weight-
ing the KL term in ELBO, which could result in higher
reconstruction losses. In this vein, DIP-VAE matches the
moments of two distributions qφ(z) and p(z). In particular,
it encourages the covariance of qφ(z) to be the same as the
covariance of p(z) to minimize DKL(qφ(z)||p(z)). Using
the law of total covariance, the covariance of z ∼ qφ(z)
can be written as
Covqφ(z)(z) :=Eqφ(z)
[
(z− Eqφ(z)[z)](z− Eqφ[z][z])T
]
=Ep(x)[Covqφ(z|x)(z)] + Covp(x)[Eqφ(z|x)(z)].
(9)
For a dataset with real-valued data samples, qφ(z|x) can
be chosen to be N (µφ(x),Σφ(x)) [21] where µφ(x) and
Σφ(x) represent mean and covariance of the Gaussian
z for a given x as a function of the parameter φ. Then,
plugging the mean and covariance of qφ(z|x) in (9), we
get Covqφ[z](z) = Ep(x)[Σφ(x)]+Covp(x)[µφ(x)] which
has to be close to the identity matrix for the case when
p(z) ∼ N (0, I). By using l2-norm as the measure of the
proximity, DIP-VAE solves the following optimization
problem
max
θ,φ
Ep(x)
[LELBO(x)]− λod∑
i 6=j
[Covp(x)[µφ(x)]]
2
ij−
λd
∑
i
([Covp(x)[µφ(x)]]ii − 1)2,
(10)
6where LELBO is the same as (6), and λd and λod are
two hyper-parameters controlling penalties induced by the
diagonal and the off-diagonal components in Covqφ(z)(z),
respectively.
• FactorVAE: As mentioned previously, weighting the KL
term DKL(qφ(z|x)||p(z)) by a β > 1 could negatively
impact the reconstruction performance of VAE. Mathe-
matically, this can be seen from
Ep(x)[DKL(qφ(z|x)||p(z))] = I(x; z) + DKL(qφ(z)||p(z)),
(11)
where I(x; z) is the mutual information between x and
z. Therefore, penalizing DKL(qφ(z|x)||p(z) is a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, it forces qφ(z) to be close
to p(z) = N (0, I), and encourages learning disentangled
representations. On the other hand, by penalizing I(x; z)
it encourages learning a z independent of x, which would
limit the amount of information stored in z about x. Thus
a larger β leads to a better disentanglement but reduces the
reconstruction quality. Similar to DIP-VAE, FactorVAE
avoids this conflict by augmenting DKL(qφ(z)||p(z)) to
the ELBO (6) in order to directly encourage independence
in the latent variables, which results in the following
objective:
max
θ,φ
Ep(x)
[
Eqφ(z|x)[log pθ(x|z)]
]−
Ep(x)
[
DKL(qφ(z|x)||p(z))
]− γDKL(qφ(z)||p(z)),
(12)
where p(z) is assumed to be of the form
∏J
j=1 p(zj) and
J denotes dimension of z. Although the idea of directly
minimizing DKL(qφ(z)||p(z)) was used in DIP-VAE
as well, FactorVAE takes a different approach towards
achieving this goal. Specifically, FactorVAE estimates the
density ratio,
DKL(qφ(z)||p(z)) = Eqφ(z)
[
log
qφ(z)
p(z)
]
, (13)
via density-ratio trick [24]. For each mini-batch, it gener-
ates samples from both qφ(z) and p(z), and approximates
(13) by a model Dψ parameterized by a DNN ψ, which
takes a sample z as input and outputs the probability that
z belongs to qφ(z). Then, utilizing
DKL(qφ(z)||p(z)) = Eqφ(z)
[
log
Dψ(z)
1−Dψ(z)
]
, (14)
(12) can be jointly maximized over the set of parameters
ψ, θ, φ, each of which is taken to be a DNN in this work.
A. Learning useful representations from NC-OFDM signals
In this section, we describe training of VAEs on a dataset
D of NC-OFDM signals whose entries consist of samples of
an NC-OFDM signal s(t) in (1) obtained by
s(kTs) =
N∑
n=1
u(n)s0,ne
j2pifn(kTs), k = 0, . . . , n1 − 1, (15)
where 1/Ts denotes the sampling rate. We concate-
nate the real and imaginary parts of the samples in
(15) to build a single sample xi of size d = 2n1
in the form xi = [R(s(0)),R(s(Ts)), . . . ,R(s((n1 −
1)Ts)), I(s(0)), I(s(Ts)), . . . , I(s((n1 − 1)Ts))] for D. We
have chosen encoder qφ(z|x) and decoder pθ(x|z) to be
Gaussian with diagonal covariance matrix having means muφ
and µθ, and variances σ2φ, σ
2
θ , respectively. We note that the
learned representations z are distributed around the mean of
qφ(z|x), denoted by µφ, and they approach µφ when σ2φ goes to
zero. Encoder (resp., decoder) is modeled with a fully connected
feed-forward DNN whose outputs are µφ and σ2φ (resp., µθ
and σ2θ ). These DNNs have 5 hidden layers with 200, 400, 600,
400, and 200 number of neurons in each layer. We also have
trained DNNs of larger parameter spaces, but the performance
of the networks did not improve noticeably. The prior p(z) is
also chosen to be a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and
identity covariance matrix, which makes it possible to compute
the KL term in (6) analytically [21]. We build two NC-OFDM
datasets whose signals are generated by two different subcarrier
occupancy patterns, and investigate the properties of the learned
representations by the FactorVAE (12) with γ = 5, which has
shown to be able to find disentangled representations effectively
(see Section VII). Training is done via mini-batches of size 100
with a learning rate of 0.0005 over a dataset of size 500, 000.
In order to study what information has been encoded to each
dimension of the latent space, we use a common technique
called latent traversal. After training a VAE, latent traversal
obtains the representation z corresponding to a data sample xi.
To study what information the ith latent variable (zi) represents
about x, latent traversal changes the value of zi (e.g. between
[−3, 3]) while fixing the other latent variables and studies the
corresponding changes induced by the decoder in the fast
Fourier transform (FFT) of the reconstructed sample xˆ.
First, we consider a dataset of NC-OFDM signals with
a structured band allocation based on 3 different occupancy
pattern vectors depicted in Fig. 5. We note that this is given as
a toy example, which enables us to fully describe the properties
of the learned latent space by a VAE through choosing a small
number of subcarriers N = 8 with only 3 distinct occupancy
patterns. The number of latent variables in FactorVAE is set to
Nz = 16, pn ∈ [1, 2], n = . . . , N , where a larger pn indicates
a higher SNR for a fixed noise variance N0. Binary phase-shift
keying (BPSK) is utilized as the modulation technique at the
transmitter. Also, n1 = 16 complex samples are collected from
each signal (15) for building the dataset. We have done latent
traversal on a trained VAE for latent variables, six of which
are depicted for instance in Fig. 7, where the input signal x
to the VAE is a signal from Case 1 depicted in Fig. 5. We
observe that the VAE only encodes information in 5 distinct
latent variables z16, z12, z13, z15 and z9, which are called
informative latent variables and control the amount of power
in 5 distinct active subcarriers depicted in Fig. 5. The other 11
variables are uninformative (e.g., z5) that carry no information
about x as changing them does not have any effect on the
reconstructed sample. As we chose p(z) ∼ N (0, I), we note
that the learned representations lie within a continuous space
whose dimensions capture the amount of power in different
subcarriers as suggested by Fig. 7. Specifically, changing an
informative latent variable could result in generating an output
xˆ by the decoder that belongs to a different case than that of x.
7Fig. 5. Three different band allocations based on which we have generated
the NC-OFDM signals in the dataset. An inactive subcarrier is denoted by
dashed lines.
Fig. 6. VAE maps the NC-OFDM signals to a continuous space z. Latent
traversal for zi is shown by an arrow where xi and xˆi belong to the cases
denoted by the arrow’s tail and tip, respectively.
For example, by changing z13 (and fixing the other variables),
a signal from Case 2 can be generated while the input signal
belongs to Case 1. One can interpret this as the decoder is
changing the amount of power in subcarriers 7 and 4 through
changing z13. Similarly, by changing z9 a signal from Case
3 can be generated. This is illustrated in Fig. 6 for the whole
space of z, which shows how the VAE exploits the subcarrier
occupancy pattern for finding a continuous representation space
that covers all signals in the training dataset.
Next, we consider NC-OFDM signals with random occu-
pancy pattern vectors where active subcarriers are chosen in a
random fashion, i.e., each element in u is 0 or 1 with probability
0.5. Similar to the structured case, pn ∈ [1, 2] and BPSK
is used as the modulation technique. We consider the total
number of subcarriers to be N = 16 (216 different subcarrier
occupancy patterns), number of latent variables Nz = 20 and
n1 = 32. Latent traversal, in this case, shows that informative
latent variables control the amount of power in exactly one
subcarrier in this case (Fig. 8). As an example, one can see that
changing z2 results in changing the power in the 12th subcarrier
of xˆ. In other words, z2 represents the relative amount of
power in the 12th subcarrier. A similar graph to Fig. 6 can
be sketched for this case as well where there are 216 different
band allocations. We note that 16 out of 20 latent variables
correspond to 16 different subcarriers, and the remaining 4
variables are uninformative. Therefore, one can see that VAE
is capable of learning a representation z where each latent
variable zi corresponds to the relative amount of power in a
unique subcarrier.
B. Spectrum sensing via VAEs
For an adversary that is constantly listening to the transmit-
ting terminal for a certain amount of time, the received signals
could either be just noise or corrupted NC-OFDM signals.
PHY spoofing involves processing the latter in order to infer
Fig. 7. Latent traversal for a dataset of NC-OFDM signals based on Fig. 5. x
belongs to Case 1. FFTs (8 points) of the reconstructed signals xˆ are depicted.
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Fig. 8. Latent traversal for a dataset of NC-OFDM signals with random band
allocation. FFTs (16 points) of the reconstructed signals xˆ are depicted.
certain transmission parameters. Therefore, it is important for
the adversary to distinguish between the noise only signals
and the transmitted signals; this process is known as spectrum
sensing. We utilize Gaussian mixture (GM) VAEs [19] for this
purpose, which similar to VAEs, are generative models built
upon the idea of variational inference. However, unlike VAEs
which assume the data are generated from one continuous
latent variable z, GMVAEs consider one continuous and one
discrete latent variable denoted by z and y, respectively, where
z itself is also assumed to be generated from a continuous
latent variable w. ELBO for GMVAEs is obtained in [19] for
the case where the prior distribution of z and w is Gaussian,
while y follows a categorical distribution with a predefined
number of classes denoted by k. Once trained to maximize
the ELBO, GMVAEs cluster the data into k different groups
based on their distributions. For the PHY spoofing scenario
where the training dataset consists of signals belonging to either
of the two aforementioned types, GMVAE learns to assign
signals of the same type to the same cluster. Furthermore, as
pure-noise signals tend to have lower energy compared to the
corrupted signals, one can distinguish between the clusters by
comparing the histograms of energies of the signals in each
8cluster. We note that this spectrum sensing approach is done
in an unsupervised manner without the need for any labels.
C. VAEs for PHY spoofing
We now study how VAEs can be leveraged to compromise
the PHY security in NC-OFDM/OFDM systems. As shown
in Section IV-A, VAEs can learn important information about
the NC-OFDM transmission parameters in an unsupervised
manner. Specifically, a VAE extracts the following information
about the NC-OFDM signals:
• Subcarrier occupancy pattern: The learned representation
zj corresponding to a subcarrier (correspondence can be
found by latent traversal) that is inactive in a data sample
xi is close to zero as the power sent on that subcarrier
is zero. Therefore, the subcarrier occupancy pattern can
be inferred by applying a threshold test to the learned
representations (threshold value depends on the SNR of
the received signals and is estimated by cross-validation).
• Modulation scheme: Through utilizing different modula-
tion schemes in NC-OFDM signals, we have observed
that the learned VAEs allocate one (two) latent variable(s)
to each subcarrier when real (complex) symbols are being
sent through each subcarrier. This can be justified by
noting that VAEs treat the real and imaginary parts of
a symbol transmitted through each subcarrier as distinct
generative factors of the data and allocate separate latent
variables to capture each one. This fact can be utilized
to distinguish between modulation schemes that use
real versus complex symbols (e.g., BPSK versus QAM).
Also, as higher-order modulations send more power
through each subcarrier, latent traversal can be utilized
to distinguish them from lower-order ones. However,
identifying the modulation scheme, in general, may need
resorting to specific classifiers as discussed in [18].
• Total number of active subcarriers: As VAEs treat the real
and imaginary powers in active subcarriers as generative
factors of the dataset, the total number of active subcarriers
in the whole dataset amounts to the number of informative
latent variables when real symbols are being sent through
each subcarrier (like in BPSK modulation), and is half
this number when complex symbols (like in QAM or PSK
modulation) are being used.
For example, for the random allocation case considered in
Fig. 8, we have observed that one latent variable encodes
each subcarrier, which means BPSK is used as the modulation
scheme, and there are 16 informative latent variables, which
indicates the number of subcarriers is N = 16. It is shown in
section VII that VAEs are agnostic to the true signal bandwidth
in these inferences. In other words, as long as signals are
sampled above the Nyquist rate and stored in the dataset, the
rate at which an adversary is sampling the received signals
doesn’t matter. This is particularly important from an adversary
point of view because as pointed out in [11], it is a major
hurdle to estimate the bandwidth in the case of NC-OFDM
signals.
We now incorporate these findings with the system model
described in Section II. Here, the adversary only has access to
Fig. 9. Block diagrams of two DNNs used for estimating transmission
parameters by the adversary.
Fig. 10. Schematic of a DNN with 3 hidden layers.
a corrupted version of s(t), denoted by r(t) in Section II-A.
As the training data samples are noisy in this case, we propose
the following change to the original VAE objective function
(6):
L′(x) = −DKL(qφ(z|x)||p(z)) + ηEqφ(z|x)[log pθ(x|z)],
(16)
where we have weighted the reconstruction loss with a constant
η < 1 which is inversely proportional to SNR of the received
signals and is obtained using cross-validation. This would lessen
the reconstruction penalty and mitigate the effect of noise in
the reconstructed signals by allowing VAEs to generate samples
that are different than the input noisy ones. We note that the
resulting bound remains a lower bound to the evidence p(x).
We have seen through our experiments in Section VII that this
greatly improves the spoofing performance (which depends
on the accuracy of the learned representations) in the case of
noisy samples. After training a VAE on the dataset of received
signals, during the test stage, the adversary inputs a signal to
the trained VAE and estimates the aforementioned transmission
parameters for PHY spoofing.
V. PHY SPOOFING VIA SUPERVISED LEARNING
In this section, we assume the adversary has access to
true labels for each data sample (i.e., a noisy received NC-
OFDM/OFDM signal) in the dataset and makes use of them in
the training stage. The adversary trains fully connected DNNs
to estimate transmission parameters. Similar to the unsupervised
spoofing, we assume that the adversary builds up a dataset
out of the samples of the received noisy signals denoted by
r(kTs) in Section II-A to extract n1 (complex) samples. Fig.
10 demonstrates a general schematic of a DNN. Besides, Fig.
9 illustrates two DNNs utilized for estimating transmission
parameters, where the specifications of the upper DNN are:
9TABLE II
NUMBER OF NEURONS IN THE HIDDEN LAYERS FOR THE DNNS DESCRIBED IN FIG. 9.
Hidden layer 1 2 3 4
Upper DNN 200 400 200 50
Lower DNN 350 600 400 200
• Input: xi = [R(r(0)), . . . ,R(r((n/2 −
1)T )), I(r(0)), . . . , I(r((n/2− 1)T ))].
• Output: Estimated total number of subcarriers and
estimated subcarrier width, i.e., [N̂ , ∆̂f ].
• Architecture: See Table II. The activation function for
all the layers is chosen to be rectified linear unit (ReLU)
function.
• Training: We minimize the l2-loss ‖[N̂ , ∆̂f ] −
[N, ∆f ]‖2, where N and ∆f are the true parameters.
Learning rate is set to 0.0001.
The properties of the DNN utilized to infer u are described as
follows:
• Input: The same input vector described for the above
DNN.
• Output: Estimated subcarrier occupancy pattern vector
û.
• Architecture: See Table II. The activation function for
all the layers is chosen to be ReLU function except for
the output layer, where the sigmoid function is used. The
adversary further converts the output values to 0’s and
1’s using a hard-thresholding function defined by h(t) ={
0, 0 ≤ t ≤ 0.5,
1, 0.5 < t ≤ 1.
• Training: The DNN is trained by minimizing
Dist(u, û) =
∑N
i=1(u(i) − û(i))2 where u is the
true subcarrier occupancy pattern.
We investigate the performance of the adversary when Tx
is transmitting signals through 4 different types of subcarrier
occupancy patterns. 1) A single contiguous block of active
subcarriers (OFDM signal). 2) NC-OFDM signal whose band
allocation is illustrated in Fig. 11 where integer q denotes the
number of inactive subcarriers between active ones and integer
c denotes the length of a block of contiguous active subcarriers.
We refer to it as Pattern 1 in the following. For training and
test purposes, we generate signals of this type with q in the
range [1, 6] and c in the range [4, 43] where the location of c
in the band is considered to be random. 3) NC-OFDM signal
whose band allocation is illustrated in Fig. 12 and is referred
to as Pattern 2. Here, there are two blocks of contiguous active
subcarriers of length c, which is in the range [3, 15], and three
different interleaved factors q1, q2 and q3, all belonging to
the range [1, 8]. 4) NC-OFDM signal where the bands are
allocated in a random fashion without any specific pattern. In
other words, we assume the transmitter flips a coin to decide
whether a subcarrier is active or inactive.
The adversary receives signals of one of the above types at a
certain SNR (spoofing SNR) during the training stage and trains
the aforementioned DNNs on the corresponding dataset (one of
the four datasets of signals). Then, it utilizes the trained model
in the test stage to estimate the transmission parameters and
PHY spoofs an unknown signal that has the same occupancy
Fig. 11. Subcarrier occupancy pattern 1; location of the contiguous block (c)
is random.
Fig. 12. Subcarrier occupancy pattern 2; locations of the contiguous blocks
are random.
pattern type as in the training dataset. In this way, we are
able to study how the choices of occupancy patterns affect the
spoofing performance of the adversary. The number of signals
in the training and test datasets for each case is set to 2× 106
and 25× 104, respectively. As mentioned in Section II, since
the Tx may change the transmission parameters (particularly
u) while transmitting an NC-OFDM symbol, the Rx also needs
to infer these parameters, which can be done via DNNs as
described above for the adversary. This is a fair model as the
only advantage Rx has over the adversary is a better receiving
channel.
A. Utilizing supervised learning to solve Example 1
We discussed in section III how CAF-based analysis fails
to infer parameters of a simple NC-OFDM signal. Here, we
now consider the same problem described in Example 1 again,
and utilize a DNN to solve it in a supervised manner. Here,
as the underlying dataset is simpler (there are only 3 different
transmission cases) in comparison to the problem described in
the previous section, we are able to solve the problem with a
much simpler model. Specifically, we consider two architectures
for the DNN. The first one has a hidden layer with 50 neurons,
and the second one has 3 hidden layers of 500, 250 and 50
neurons per each layer. The number of neurons at the input
layer in both DNNs is set to 150. The properties of the DNN
which estimates the set of parameters [q, Tu] are as follows.
• Input: Samples of the received signal (similar to the
previous DNNs).
• Output: Estimated parameters [qˆ, T̂u].
• Training: We minimize the l2-loss ‖[q, Tu] − [qˆ, T̂u]‖2,
where [q, Tu] are the true parameters.
As another approach, we consider a DNN which classifies
between the three different transmission cases introduced in
Table I. The specifications for this DNN are as follows.
• Input: Samples of the received signal (similar to the
previous DNNs).
• Output: pˆ = [pˆ1, pˆ2, pˆ3] where pˆi denotes the estimated
probability that the inputs correspond to case i, and∑
i pˆi = 1.
• Training: We minimize the cross-entropy loss between
pˆ and p = [p1, p2, p3], i.e., −
∑
i pi log pˆi where pi
represents the true probability that the signal belongs
to case i.
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For solving this problem, we consider training and test sets of
size 5 × 105 and 3 × 105, respectively, which consist of the
signals corresponding to the three transmission cases in Table
I at spoofing SNR of 5 dB. The performances of these DNNs
are presented in Section VII, showing that they are indeed
capable of estimating the transmission parameters that CAF
had failed to infer.
VI. DISENTANGLEMENT METRICS AND USEFUL
REPRESENTATIONS
Despite its importance, measuring the usefulness of the
learned representation in a VAE model is not yet a well-studied
subject. This is partly due to the context-dependent nature
of the problem that makes it challenging for researchers to
reach a consensus on this matter. As mentioned in Section
IV, disentanglement is one of the features that is particularly
desirable for the learned representations in a variety of
applications. In this section, we characterize the properties
of a disentangled representation by utilizing/extending the
ideas from ML literature, describe why they are useful, and
devise appropriate metrics to measure the disentanglement
performance in the case of NC-OFDM datasets. Recall that
[22] assumes a finite number of generative factors k1, . . . , kf
are used to generate the data samples in the dataset, where
each factor could represent notions like position, scale, rotation,
etc., in the case of image samples, or amount of power sent
over distinct subcarriers for NC-OFDM/OFDM signals (see
Section IV-A). Then, [22] calls the learned representations
disentangled if changes in one of the generative factors of
the data are mirrored by the encoder qφ(z|x) in Fig. 4 in
exactly one of the latent variables (i.e., one dimension of the
latent space). We describe such an encoder to function in a
disentangled manner. By extending this definition, we call
the learned representations z disentangled if decoder pφ(x|z)
functions in a disentangled manner as well, i.e., it employs
only one latent variable for each generative factor during the
reconstruction process. In the remainder of this section, we
discuss how to measure the disentangled performance of the
encoder and decoder in VAEs utilizing existing and newly
proposed metrics.
In order to measure the performance of the encoder in
achieving the disentangled representations, we will utilize the
metrics proposed by Haggin et al. in [23] and by Kim et al.
in [22]. The authors in [23] introduce a quantitative metric
for measuring disentanglement assuming generative factors
k1, . . . , kf of the dataset are known. This metric works as
follows. Choose a data sample x0 and obtains its corresponding
representation z0 via the encoder of a trained VAE. Then,
generate L data samples {xi}Li=1 by fixing value of a generative
factor kl (l = 1, . . . , f ) while changing values of the other
factors uniformly at random in an interval (e.g. [−3, 3]). Next,
find their corresponding learned representations {zi}Li=1, and
use 1L
∑L
i=1 |zi − z0| and the fixed factor’s index (l) as a
training sample to train a linear classifier where l is treated
as label. Then, the correct classification rate achieved by this
classifier on a test set (generated in the same way as the
training set) is reported as the metric. A more stringent metric
for disentanglement is proposed in [22], which works as follows.
Choose a generative factor (kl), generate data {xi}Li=1 with
this factor fixed while the others’ values are changed randomly,
and obtain their corresponding learned representations {zi}Li=1.
Then, normalize each dimension of zi, i = 1, . . . , L, by its
empirical standard deviation computed over {zi}Li=1 to obtain
normalized representations {z¯i}Li=1. The empirical variance for
an arbitrary real-valued vector w = [w1, w2, . . . , wh] of length
h is defined as
V̂ ar(w) =
1
2h(h− 1)
h∑
i,j=1
(wi − wj)2. (17)
Then, compute the empirical variances of each dimension in
{z¯i}Li=1, which are denoted by [v1, . . . , vNz ]. Afterward, the
index of the dimension with the lowest variance (argmini vi)
and the fixed factor index l provide one training sample for the
classifier. The performance of this classifier (measured between
0 and 100) on the test set is reported as the final metric.
Next, we evaluate the performance of the VAE’s decoder in
achieving disentangled representations utilizing latent traversal
method described in Section IV-A. In the case of disentangled
representations, each latent variable governs a specific gener-
ative factor in the reconstructed sample through the decoder.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code for our proposed metric,
which outputs a decimal value between 0 and 100. Specifically,
this algorithm changes the value of the j-th latent variable zij
(corresponding to the input data sample xi) in range [−C,C]
with steps of 2C/K while fixing the others, obtains the element-
wise difference between FFT of the reconstructed samples and
FFT of xi, and counts the number of subcarriers in which the
magnitude of the difference is more than a predefined threshold
. If there is only one subcarrier, it represents a disentangled
latent variable and zij gets a perfect score (100). If there is more
than one, then zij gets 0. This would be done for all the Nz
latent variables, and L different data samples {xi}Li=1. Then,
the final metric equals the averaged score over all the data
samples and the number of informative latent variables (denoted
by I in Alg. 1). We have used C = 3,K = 40, L = 500 (larger
values did not change the result noticeably) and two different
values of , i.e., 0.5 and 1 in our experiments.
We consider a VAE to have learned disentangled represen-
tations if it achieves a score of 100 for both Kim’s metric
[22] and the proposed latent traversal metric (Alg. 1). Such a
VAE is well-suited for a dataset of NC-OFDM signals where
the amount of power is independent in different subcarriers.
More specifically, as VAEs encode these power in the latent
space z, the corresponding learned representation is expected
to be disentangled. Therefore, designing a VAE model that
captures this important property of the dataset enables one to
find accurate representations and improve the performance of
the unsupervised PHY spoofing described in Section IV.
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we first present the result of numerical
simulations that characterize the performance of an adversary
utilizing unsupervised and supervised learning algorithms for
PHY spoofing as discussed in Sections IV and IV. Then, we
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Algorithm 1: Latent traversal for a dataset of NC-OFDM
signals
Output: Disentanglement metric S0 (out of 100) and I , the
number of informative latent variables.
Input: A VAE model (φ, θ), dataset {xi}Li=1, number of latent
variables Nz, traversing limit C, traversing step K, averaging
factor L, precision factor , S1 = 0 .
for i = 1 to L do
Pick data point (xi), S2← 0, I ← 0
while j < Nz + 1 do
zi ← mean of qφ(z|xi),v1 ← zero-vector, j ← 1
for k = 0 to K do
zij ← −C + 2Ck/K, v2 ← zero-vector,
x̂← mean of pθ(x|zi)
F← Element-wise magnitude of
(FFT (xˆ)− FFT (xi)), T ← length of F
v2(t)← 1 if F(t) >  for t = 1, . . . , T ,
v1 ← v1 + v2
end
k ← Number of non-zero elements in v1
if k == 1 then
S2← S2 + 100, I ← I + 1
else if k > 1 then
S2← 0, I ← I + 1
j ← j + 1
end
S1← S1 + S2/I
end
S0 = S1/M
provide our results and insights on disentanglement metrics
presented in Section VI. We begin with investigating the
performance of the supervised learning based on DNNs
described in Section V-A for spoofing the system introduced
in Example 1. This is demonstrated in Fig. 13 where two
different DNN structures are considered for each classification
and estimation scenario. Note that the y-axis represents correct
classification probability for classification curves, and l2-loss
for the estimation problems on the test set. Specifically, it is
shown that for the classification problem, even using one hidden
layer enables us to identify the true class of the test signals
after around 1000 training steps with very high probability.
In each training step, mini-batches of size 500 are chosen
from the training set and the SGD algorithm with a learning
rate of 0.0005 is applied to train the DNNs. Furthermore,
if the adversary wishes to estimate the true parameters of
the signal (i.e., [q, Tu]), average l2-losses as low as 0.1 are
achievable using DNN estimator with only one hidden layer.
We also observe that a higher number of layers results in better
performances in both cases.
Now, we consider the system model described in Section II
where the corresponding PHY parameters between different
communication parties follow the narrowband (NB)-IoT [9],
[25] standard that is widely used in the existing IoT solutions
[9]. Specifically, the transmission is assumed to take place over
an NC-OFDM scheme with ∆f ∈ [15, 30, 45, 60] KHz and
pn ∈ [1, 2] utilizing BPSK modulation with random subcarrier
occupancy pattern using the total number of subcarriers N = 16
and N = 32, which give rise to 216 and 232 distinct subcarrier
occupancy patterns, respectively (see Section IV-A). Adversary
overhears the transmissions at a certain spoofing SNR and
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Fig. 13. Performance of DNNs described in Section V-A in solving Example
1.
Fig. 14. Histogram of energies of signals in two clusters of GMVAE.
builds up a dataset out of the received noisy signals where 80
complex samples are collected from each signal. The size of
the training and the test dataset is set to 2× 106 and 25× 104,
respectively. As described in Section IV-B, the adversary first
trains a GMVAE on a dataset consisting of both pure noise
signals and corrupted NC-OFDM signals in order to distinguish
between the two. Specifically, we have trained a GMVAE with
k = 2, where the dimension of both z and w is set to 20, on
a dataset consists of 50000 pure noise and noisy NC-OFDM
signals at SNR 5 dB with random band allocation and N = 16.
Fig. 14 shows the histograms of energies of the signals in
each cluster, where a clear distinction between the two is
demonstrated. As noise signals have lower energy, one would
know that they will belong to cluster 2. The classification
accuracy of GMVAE is evaluated as 99.6%.
Fig. 15 illustrates the spoofing performance for several su-
pervised and unsupervised learning algorithms for both AWGN
and fading environments. For the fading case, we consider
a multi-path fading channel with amplitudes [1, 0.8, 0.6] and
delays [0, 2, 4]µs for Tx-adversary channel, and a Rayleigh flat-
fading for both of the Adversary-Rx and Tx-Rx channels. For
the unsupervised cases, we assume the adversary is utilizing
the FactorVAE model with γ = 5. Then, it infers the total
number of subcarriers and the corresponding latent variable
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for each subcarrier via latent traversal as described in Section
IV. During the test stage, it obtains the corresponding learned
representation (mean of qφ(z|x)) for a test signal and decides
whether a subcarrier is active or inactive as discussed in
Section IV. For the supervised cases, the specifications of
the DNNs are presented in Section V. Fig. 15 shows that
the supervised algorithm offers better spoofing performance
in general as it relies on the ground truth labels. Spoofing
performance in a fading channel is worse for both supervised
and unsupervised algorithms in comparison to the AWGN
channel as the quality of the received signals by the adversary
is deteriorated. This also holds for the case where the signals
in the dataset are corrupted by the interference from other
transmitting sources at different signal to interference plus noise
ratios (SINRs). The higher number of subcarriers N (32 vs. 16),
in general, negatively affects the performance of the adversary
in both cases. Also, as the spoofing SNR increases, spoofing
performance improves as well. Specifically, if the spoofing
SNR is 10 dB, the supervised spoofing performance can get
very close to the baseline transmission (the best spoofing
performance). Furthermore, it is shown that the adversary can
spoof the signal to certain degrees via VAEs if the spoofing SNR
is high (e.g., 12 dB). We note that as the adversary estimates the
transmission parameters with higher accuracy, it can achieve
better spoofing performance. For example, for the supervised
spoofing in the AWGN scenario with N = 16 presented in
Fig. 15, mean error estimation of subcarrier occupancy pattern
by the adversary decreases from 1.2× 10−3 to 1.6× 10−4 as
spoofing SNR increases from 7 dB to 10 dB. Similarly, for
unsupervised spoofing at SNR 10, this error is computed as
8×10−4 and 4.5×10−4 for N = 32 and N = 16, respectively,
which indicates a better spoofing performance in the latter case.
Next, we consider an NC-OFDM transmission with a higher
number of subcarriers N = 44 where 16-QAM modulation
is utilized by the Tx. We investigate the performance of
the adversary utilizing the supervised learning algorithm for
spoofing in both AWGN and fading environments, and assume
it collects n1 = 100 samples from each received signal
at different spoofing SNRs. Here, we consider 4 different
occupancy patterns described in Section V to investigate their
resilience against PHY spoofing. Fig. 16 demonstrates the
performance of the adversary in different scenarios based on
different spoofing SNRs and occupancy pattern vectors. For the
OFDM scenario, the adversary is able to infer the occupancy
pattern without error and can achieve the same performance as
the baseline transmission. For Pattern 1 NC-OFDM signal, the
DNNs are trained and tested at 3 different spoofing SNRs of 5
and 10 dB, where as expected the higher spoofing SNRs result
in better spoofing performance. Comparing to the baseline
transmission, there is a gap in the performances since the
parameters are estimated with some error. For Pattern 2, one
can see that the performance is worse in comparison to Pattern 1
as the Tx is using a more complex subcarrier occupancy pattern
with a higher number of distinct band allocations. Therefore,
one can conclude that Pattern 2 NC-OFDM signals are more
difficult to spoof. It is also shown that the spoofing performance
is worse in fading scenarios (with the same specifications
described for Fig. 15) where the signals are received from a
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Fig. 16. Supervised spoofing performance of the adversary when
different frequency occupancy patters are used by the Tx.
multipath channel.
For the random occupancy case, it is shown that BER is
0.5 at spoofing SNR of 2 dB for a wide range of Eb/N0’s
corresponding to the adversary-Rx channel, which indicates that
the adversary is unable to spoof such signals at SNR 2 dB (or
lower) because of the high estimation errors at the output of the
DNNs. As a result, the PHY is considered to be secure when
spoofing SNR is lower than 2 dB while Tx-Rx SNR is set to 16
dB in order to ensure reliable communication in the meantime.
Fig. 16 also demonstrates the spoofing performance for the case
of random occupancy patterns with N = 64. Due to the larger
number of possible subcarrier occupancy patterns, the Rx is
unable to estimate the transmission parameters via the Tx-Rx
channel correctly even when the Tx-Rx SNR is 30 dB for this
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Fig. 17. FFT of the reconstructed signals in DIP-VAE (λd = λod = 50)
obtained under latent traversal. zi denotes the fixed latent variable.
case which precludes achieving a reliable communication. In
other words, although this scheme prevents the adversary from
PHY spoofing, it also fails to ensure reliable communication
for legitimate Tx and Rx pairs. In the case where multiple users
are transmitting over a certain frequency band in the presence
of spectrum incumbents, random band allocation, which is now
applied to the accessible frequencies only, enables opportunistic
use of the spectrum holes. This intrinsically improves spectral
efficiency and enables shared multiple access for the users. Even
if there is no spectrum incumbent, the NC-OFDM scheme while
providing secure transmission can recover the loss of spectrum
efficiency when multiple links, each using NC-OFDM, share
the available bandwidth as shown in [26].
Next, we have evaluated the metrics described in Section
VI in Table III for different VAE models trained on a dataset
of NC-OFDM signals with N = 16 and random subcarrier
occupancy patterns where BPSK modulation with pn ∈ [1, 2] is
used. The number of latent variables is set to Nz = 20 and the
encoder/decoder is modeled with feed-forward DNNs described
in Section IV-A. Table III shows that the performance of the
encoder and decoder in terms of disentanglement may vary
greatly. In other words, metrics in [22], [23] do not guarantee
a disentangled representation in the case of latent traversal.
For example, for the DIP-VAE models described in Section
IV (with parameters λd = λod = 5 and λd = λod = 50),
one can see that although they achieve perfect scores (100)
for the metrics proposed in [22], [23], they perform poorly
on the metric based on the latent traversal. This is illustrated
in Figs. 17 and 18. It is clear that the learned representation
could not be considered disentangled since changing one latent
variable affects the values of the others. Reconstruction error
is also reported in Table III, which represents the ability of the
VAE model to reconstruct the input signal xi, and is defined
as
∑d
j=1 |xi(j) − xˆi(j)| (element-wise subtraction) where d
denotes the dimension of xi.
As discussed in Section VI, we say a VAE model results
in perfectly disentangled representations if it achieves perfect
scores for both Kim’s metric [22] and the latent traversal
metric (Alg. 1). There, we also argued how such a VAE
is particularly relevant for PHY spoofing NC-OFDM/OFDM
signals where the amount of power is independent in different
subcarriers. Specifically, the Kim’s metric ensures that a specific
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Fig. 18. FFT of the reconstructed signals in DIP-VAE model (λd = λod = 5)
obtained under latent traversal.
learned representation (by the encoder) corresponding to a
generative factor is not affected by the changes in other
generative factors. The latent traversal metric implies that the
learned representations corresponding to different generative
factors are disjoint. This can be seen by comparing the
learned representations for two different VAEs: DIP-VAE
with (λd = λod = 50) and FactorVAE with γ = 5 whose
latent traversal performance is demonstrated in Figs. 17 and 8,
respectively. First, it should be noted that only in FactorVAE
model, which achieves perfectly disentangled representations,
a latent variable corresponds to exactly one subcarrier via
the decoder. For these VAEs, we also have illustrated the
learned representations corresponding to two different latent
variables via a 2D space in Figs. 19. The VAE’s decoder
maps each point in this space to a signal whose corresponding
power in two different subcarriers follows the values of these
two latent variables. Both models achieve perfect scores on
Kim’s metric [22]. However, one can see that the learned
representations for the case of FactorVAE in Fig. 19 are disjoint
while they overlap for DIP-VAE in Fig. 20. In fact, this is
the reason why DIP-VAE in Fig. 17 gets a low score on the
latent traversal metric. By changing the value of one of the
latent variables (e.g. z5) at a time, a signal can be generated
whose power changes in more than one subcarrier (p5 and p15).
On the other hand, in a perfectly disentangled latent space,
the learned representations that get mapped to signals with
different power levels in each subcarrier form a disjoint region
as illustrated in Fig. 19. Specifically, one can see that the
representations corresponding to a signal with specific power
levels in different subcarriers form a region in z space. Disjoint
representations facilitate downstream tasks like classification
as the data samples generated by different generative factors
get mapped to distinct regions.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the PHY robustness of the NC-
OFDM/OFDM system in IoT against an adversary equipped
with machine learning tools. Specifically, we have assumed
the adversary employs supervised and unsupervised learning
algorithms to infer some of the NC-OFDM transmission
parameters and physically spoof the system. The proposed unsu-
pervised algorithm utilizes VAEs for spoofing, which can infer
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TABLE III
DISENTANGLEMENT METRICS AND RECONSTRUCTION LOSS COMPUTED FOR DIFFERENT VAE MODELS
Method Parameters Haggin’smetric [23]
Kim’s
metric [22]
Alg. 1 metric
( = 0.5)
Alg. 1 metric
( = 1)
Reconst.
error
β-VAE [23] β = 10 100 100 98.25 100 6.5e-2
β-VAE β = 20 99 92 99.75 100 8.3e-2
DIP-VAE [20] λd = λod = 5 100 100 59.37 84.06 1.9e− 2
DIP-VAE λd = λod = 10 100 66 85.5 98.43 2.3e− 2
DIP-VAE λd = λod = 50 100 100 10.2 25.06 2.3e− 2
Factor-VAE [22] γ = 5 100 100 97.62 99.93 1.9e− 2
Factor-VAE γ = 10 95 40 70 85.75 3e− 2
Factor-VAE γ = 50 98 66 20.75 72.18 3.3e− 2
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Fig. 19. The learned representations z12 and z7 for FactorVAE model (γ = 5)
which control the amount of power in subcarriers 15 and 5 (p15 and p5) of
the reconstructed signal, respectively, .
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important spectral information about the NC-OFDM/OFDM
signals. Numerical results demonstrate that the PHY spoofing
performance highly depends on the subcarrier occupancy
pattern used by the transmitter. Specifically, the results suggest
that the transmitter should randomize the selection of the active
subcarriers in order to impede PHY spoofing attacks utilizing
DNNs.
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